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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this Appeal are the Appellant Tracy L. Southwick 
and the Appellees Frank Leone and Sam Leone (hereinafter, "the 
Leones"). Christine Montoya was also a party to the litigation at the 
trial court level, however, it is unknown if she will be participating 
in this appeal. 
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IV 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Appeal is vested in the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
V 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues for review on appeal are as follows: 
Issues of Fact: 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that the expenses for 
the burial plot, burial expenses, Co-conservator fees, television 
& antenna, and court costs were legitimate expenses for Mrs. 
Southwick's necessary support and maintenance. (Record, pages 
833-837). 
2. Did the trial court err in computing the amount of the 
P.O.D. account to which Mr. Southwick is entitled? (Record, 
pages 833-837) . 
Standard of Review for Issues of Fact: 
Issues of fact may be reversed on appeal only if they are found 
to be clearly erroneous. Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919 
(Utah 1988). 
Issues of Law: 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in 
concluding that the Leones were entitled to conservator 
fees? (Record, pages 515-521). 
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2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding 
that the Leones were not personally liable to Mr. Southwick for 
his money they gave to Christine Montoya? (Record, pages 570-
574) . 
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding 
that the expenses for the burial plot, burial expenses, Co-
conservator fees, television & antenna, and court costs were 
legitimate expenses for Mrs. Southwick's necessary support and 
maintenance, which could be legally paid from the P.O.D. account? 
(Record, pages 568-573, 833-837). 
Standard of Review for Issues of Law: 
Issues of law are subject to de novo review by an appellate 
court, and the court gives no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 
634 (Utah 1989). 
VI 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES. RULES. AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Statutes z 
Utah Code § 75-3-803(1) 
Utah Code § 75-3-803(3)(b) 
Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(k)2 
Cases: 
Bagalay v. Lahaina Restoration Foundation, 588 P.2d 416, 
60 Haw. 125 (1978) 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989) 
Cornish Town v. Roller. 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988) 
Matter of Guardianship of Heath's Estate, 632 P.2d 908, 
30 Wash. App. 115 (1981) 
Noves v. First Nat. Bank of Rawlins. 589 P.2d 348 (1979) 
Treatises: 
39 C.J.S. Guardian & Ward, § 36-38 
39 Am Jur 2d Guardian and Ward, § 187 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment entered in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, 
signed by Judge William B. Bohling, after a hearing before Judge John 
A. Rokich and after supplemental hearings before Judge William B. 
Bohling. 
(A) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Tracy L. Southwick appeals from the Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered in the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, signed by Judge William B. Bohling, after a hearing 
before Judge John A. Rokich and after supplemental hearings before 
Judge William B. Bohling, awarding Tracy L. Southwick a portion of a 
P.O.D. account on which he was named as a beneficiary and granting Mr. 
Southwick a judgment against Christine Montoya for the portion of the 
P.O.D. funds given her by the Leones. Mr. Southwick also appeals from 
the Judgment of the trial court determining that the Leones are not 
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personally liable to Mr. Southwick for the portion of the P.O.D. funds 
they gave to Ms. Montoya while the Leones had possession and control 
of the P.O.D. funds. Mr. Southwick further appeals the trial court's 
decision that certain expenses were expenses properly chargeable to 
the P.O.D. account. 
(B) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL COURT LEVEL 
After Mrs. Southwick1s death, Mr. Southwick filed a claim of his 
share of the P.O.D. account on March 15, 1991. The Leones denied Mr. 
Southwickfs claim and asked Judge Moffat to rule that Mr. Southwick 
had no interest in the P.O.D. account. The Leones also asked Judge 
Moffat to issue a nun pro tunc order permitting them to change the 
beneficiaries on a life insurance policy on which Mr. Southwick was a 
named beneficiary after Mrs. Southwick1s death. Judge Moffat granted 
both of the Leones motions and Mr. Southwick appealed. 
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed both of Judge Moffat's 
decisions and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination 
of Mr. Southwick's share of the P.O.D. account. A hearing was 
scheduled to determine the amount of Mr. Southwick's share of the 
P.O.D. account. Because the Leones had given the entire P.O.D. 
account to Ms. Montoya while this case was on appeal to this Court and 
while Mr. Southwick was awaiting a ruling on a motion to stay 
distribution of the funds of the P.O.D. account, which was ultimately 
granted, Mr. Southwick also asked the trial court to rule that the 
Leones were personally liable to Mr. Southwick for the funds they had 
given to Ms. Montoya. 
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A hearing was held before Judge John Rokich on August 5, 1995, 
'idence was introduced and Sam Leone testified. At the end of the 
taring, Judge Rokich took the matter under advisement and on 
ptember 27, 1994 he issued a memorandum decision awarding Mr. 
uthwick a portion of the P.O.D. account, declaring that the Leones 
re not personally liable to Mr. Southwick for the funds from the 
O.D. account they gave to Ms. Montoya and allowing certain alleged 
oenses paid by the Leones after Mrs. Southwick's death as expenses 
=trgeable against the P.O.D. account. The trial court also held that 
Montoya was obligated to return the funds from the P.O.D. account 
Mr. Southwick. Mr. Southwick filed an appeal on June 15, 1995. 
ther the Leones nor any other party to this action filed a across-
eal. 
(C) 
DISPOSITION OF CASE AT TRIAL COURT 
After a hearing to determine Mr. Southwick's share of the amount 
:he P.O.D. account and two hearings on objections to proposed 
lings of fact and conclusions of law prepared in conjunction with 
re Rokich's Memorandum Decision, a judgment was entered awarding 
Southwick a portion of the P.O.D. account, declaring that the 
es were not personally liable to Mr. Southwick for the funds from 
P.O.D. account they gave to Ms. Montoya, declaring that Ms. 
oya was personally liable to Mr. Southwick for the funds received, 
allowing certain alleged expenses paid by the Leones after Mrs. 
iwick's death as expenses chargeable against the P.O.D. account. 
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(D) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mrs. Southwick died on January 25, 1991. (Record, page 
98) . 
2. Mr. Southwick filed a Demand for Accounting and Payment of 
Proceeds of the P.O.D. account on which he was a named beneficiary on 
March 15, 1991. (Record, page 56). 
3. The Leones, Frank and Sam, who were acting as 
conservators/guardians of the Estate of Mrs. Southwick denied Mr. 
Southwick's claim on April 10, 1991. (Record, page 83). 
4. On July 16, 1991, Judge Moffat entered a minute entry 
denying Mr. Southwick's claim to the P.O.D. account and to the 
proceeds of the insurance policy. (Record, page 224). 
5. The Leone's first "Billing Request" was filed with the Court 
on February 21, 1992. (Record, page 274). 
6. The Leone's Motion for Conservators' Fees was filed on 
February 11, 1994. (Record, page 453). 
7. The last date on which Frank Leone allegedly provided 
services to Mrs. Southwick and/or to her Estate was April 2, 1991. 
(Record, page 497). 
8. The last date on which the Sam Leone allegedly provided 
services to Mrs. Southwick and/or to her Estate was December 31, 1990. 
(Record, page 477). 
9. On September 21, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a 
decision reversing Judge Moffat's Minute Entry and directing that Mr. 
Southwick be awarded one-half of the P.O.D. account and one-third of 
9 
he insurance policy. (Record, page 374). 
10. On January 7, 1994, Judge Moffat signed a minute entry 
ransferring the case back to Judge Rokich who had originally been 
ssigned to the case. (Record, page 383). 
11. Pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals, a hearing 
s held before Judge John A. Rokich on August 5, 1994, to determine 
. Southwickfs lawful share of the P.O.D. account. (Record, page 
3). 
12. At the August 5, 1994 hearing, Judge Rokich heard testimony 
I admitted evidence submitted by all parties in conjunction with Mr. 
ithwick's claim for a share of the P.O.D. account. (Record, page 
• ) • 
13. On September 27, 1994, Judge Rokich issued a Memorandum 
ision wherein he concluded that certain items claimed as expenses 
the Leones were legitimate expenses for the care of Mrs. Southwick 
could be deducted from the P.O.D. account and that other expenses 
Lined by the Leones were not legitimate expenses for the care of 
> Southwick and could not be deducted from the P.O.D. account. 
:ord, page 618). 
14. In his September 27, 1994 Memorandum Decision, Judge Rokich 
concluded that Tracy Southwick was entitled to $20,337.24 from 
P.O.D. account together with interest on the principal amount from 
date of Mrs. Southwick's death. (Record, page 620). 
15. Judge Rokich further found that Frank and Sam Leone were 
mally liable to Mr. Southwick in the amount of $1,811.50 together 
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with interest from the date of Mrs. Southwick's death. (Record, page 
620) . 
16. Judge Rokich concluded that the Leones were not personally 
liable to Mr. Southwick for the $20,337.24 of Mr. Southwick's money 
they paid to Christine Montoya. (Record, page unnumbered between 618 
and 619). 
17. Judge Rokich did not rule on Mr. Hadley's request for 
attorney's fees in his September 27, 1994 Memorandum Decision, but 
rather reserved that issue for a later decision. (Record, page 620). 
18. Pursuant to Judge Rokich's Memorandum Decision, counsel for 
Mr. Southwick prepared findings of facts conclusions of law and a 
judgment. (Record, page 659). 
19. Objections to the findings of facts conclusions of law and a 
judgment prepared by Mr. Southwick's counsel were filed and another 
hearing was held before Judge William B. Bohling on February 6, 1995, 
to rule on the various objections to the proposed findings of facts, 
conclusions of law, judgment and Mr. Hadley's claim for attorney's 
fees. The hearing was then continued until April 17, 1995. (Record, 
page 673 and 693). 
20. At the February 6, 1995 hearing, Judge Bohling ruled that 
Mr. Hadley was not entitled to any attorney's fees and again 
instructed Mr. Southwick's counsel to prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and a judgment. (Record, page no minute entry for 
this hearing is in the record). 
21. Mr. Southwick's counsel prepared proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and a judgment and submitted them to the other 
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parties, but again objections to the proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and a judgment were filed by the other parties to 
this case. (Record, page 675-688). 
22. On April 17, 1995, another hearing was held before Judge 
Bohling and the objections to the proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and a judgment were heard. (Record, page 693). 
23. On May 1, 1995, Mr. Southwick!s counsel served the other 
parties to this case with another copy of proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and a judgment. (Record, page 700). 
24. No objections to the May 1, 1995, proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and a judgment were filed and on May 19, 1995, the 
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Judgment were entered. 
(Record, page 694). 
25. On June 15, 1995, Mr. Southwick filed his Notice of Appeal. 
(Record, page 707). 
vm 
SUMMARY OFARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in concluding that the cost of the burial 
plot, burial expenses, co-conservator fees, television & antenna, and 
court costs incurred by the Leones in opposing Mr. Southwick1s demand 
for his lawful share of the P.O.D. account were legitimate expenses 
incurred for Mrs. Southwickfs necessary support and maintenance 
because those items are not for Mrs. Southwick's medical expenses or 
other expense incurred for her "necessary support and maintenance", as 
required by the January 29, 1988 Stipulation and March 2, 1988 Order. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the Leones 
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were entitled to any conservator fees because the Leones request for 
conservator fees was not timely filed and, therefore, barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. The trial court further erred as a 
matter of law in concluding that the Leones had any authority to act 
on behalf of Mrs. Southwick's estate or to invade the P.O.D. account 
for any purposes because any authority the Leones may have had 
terminated upon the death of Mrs. Southwick. The trial court also 
erred as a matter of law in concluding that the Leones were not 
personally liable to Mr. Southwick for his share of the P.O.D. funds 
given to Ms. Montoya, because the Leones had no legal authority to use 
the P.O.D. funds for any purpose or give the funds to anyone. 
IX 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE BURIAL PLOT, BURIAL 
EXPENSES, CO-CONSERVATOR FEES, TELEVISION & ANTENNA, AND COURT COSTS 
WERE LEGITIMATE EXPENSES FOR MRS. SOUTHWICK'S NECESSARY SUPPORT AND 
MAINTENANCE. THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
CONCLUDING THAT THE LEONES WERE ENTITLED TO ANY AWARD OF Conservator 
FEES AND THAT THE LEONES ARE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE TO MR. SOUTHWICK 
FOR THE FUNDS FROM THE P.O.D. ACCOUNT THEY GAVE TO MS. MONTOYA. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE BURIAL PLOT, BURIAL 
EXPENSES, CO-CONSERVATOR FEES, TELEVISION & ANTENNA, AND COURT 
COSTS WERE LEGITIMATE EXPENSES FOR MRS. SOUTHWICK'S NECESSARY 
SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE. 
The t r i a l court erred in concluding that the cos t of the burial 
p l o t , buria l expenses, co-conservator f e e s , t e l e v i s i o n & antenna, and 
court c o s t s incurred by the Leones in opposing Mr. Southwick's demand 
for h i s lawful share of the P.O.D. account were l e g i t i m a t e expenses 
incurred for Mrs. Southwick's necessary support and maintenance. The 
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referenced items are not valid expenses because those expenses violate 
the provisions of the January 24, 1988 Stipulation, for the care of 
Mrs. Southwick and the expenses violate this Court's March 2, 1988 
Order, specifying how the funds of the P.O.D. account may be spent. 
Both the January 14, 1988 Stipulation and the March 2, 1988 Order 
specify that the funds in the P.O.D. account may only be used to pay 
the "medical expenses incurred for the benefit" of Mrs. Southwick and 
to pay other expense incurred for her "necessary support and 
maintenance." (Record, pages 20, 29). None of the referenced items 
are for medical expenses incurred in the care of Mrs. Southwick, nor 
are any of the items listed necessary for Mrs. Southwick's support and 
maintenance. Therefore, those expenses are not proper expenses that 
can be charged against the P.O.D. account to reduce Mr. Southwick's 
interest in that account. 
The trial court erred in concluding that the costs incurred in 
conjunction with Mrs. Southwick's burial was an expense chargeable to 
the P.O.D. account. While it is true that the expenses of Mrs. 
Southwick's burial needed to be paid, the Leones had funds other than 
the P.O.D. account available for payment of those expenses. The 
parties to this matter stipulated that the Leones received $16,700.00 
during the time they acted as "co-guardians an co-conservator for Mrs. 
Southwick. (Record, page 831,11 s 21-22). Furthermore, the Stipulation 
and Order of the trial court, and Utah law require that the assets of 
Mrs. Southwick's estate be used for her burial and expenses before the 
P.O.D. account can be invaded. Therefore, the expenses associated 
with Mrs. Southwick's burial are not properly chargeable to the P.O.D. 
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account and those expenses cannot legally be charged against the 
P.O.D. account to reduce Mr. Southwick's interest in the P.O.D. 
account. 
The trial court erred in concluding that the costs allegedly 
incurred by the Leones in defending against Mr. Southwick's claim for 
his share of the P.O.D. account was an expense chargeable to the 
P.O.D. account. The court costs allegedly incurred in defending 
against Mr. Southwick's rightful and legal claim to his share of the 
P.O.D. account is also not an expense that can legally be charged to 
the P.O.D. account to reduce Mr. Southwick's share of the P.O.D. 
account. Those costs were not for Mrs. Southwick's medical care or 
her maintenance and support. 
The trial court erred in concluding that the costs of a new 
television and antenna was an expense chargeable to the P.O.D. 
account. The cost of a new television and antenna cannot legitimately 
or rightfully be charged against the P.O.D. account. Both the 
Stipulation and the Order with respect to Mrs. Southwick's care states 
that Mrs. Southwick is comatose. (Record, pages 19, 28). This was 
further acknowledged by Sam Leone under oath. (Record, page 781). A 
comatose person does not need a large screen TV as a part of her 
medical care and treatment. Furthermore, Mrs. Southwick already had a 
television in her room, and there was no need to buy another one, and 
if a new TV was needed, like the burial expenses, other funds were 
available for the purchase. (Record, page 831,f s 21-22). 
The trial court also erred in concluding that the conservator 
fees claimed by the Leones was an expense chargeable to the P.O.D. 
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account. While conservator*fees a~e an expense legitimately 
chargeable to the estate of a person, if timely made and documented, 
conservator fees are not chargeable to a P.O.D. account. Furthermore, 
because the Leones failed to timely make any request for conservator 
fees, any claim they allegedly had for such fees is barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPUTING THE AMOUNT OF MR. SOUTHWICK'S 
SHARE OF THE P.O.D. ACCOUNT. 
The trial court erred in computing the amount of the P.O.D. 
account to which Mr. Southwick is entitled. Because the trial court 
deducted the alleged costs of Mrs. Southwick's burial plot, burial 
expenses, the Leones1 co-conservator fees, television & antenna, and 
court costs incurred by the Leones in opposing Mr. Southwickfs demand 
for his lawful share of the P.O.D. account from the P.O.D. account 
prior to awarding Mr. Southwick his interest in the P.O.D. account, 
the trial court erred in its computation of Mr. Southwickfs share of 
the P.O.D. account. As set forth in Point I of this brief, the 
alleged costs of Mrs. Southwickfs burial plot, her burial expenses, 
the Leones1 co-conservator fees, television & antenna, and court costs 
incurred by the Leones in opposing Mr. Southwick1s demand for his 
lawful share of the P.O.D. account are not expenses properly 
chargeable to the P.O.D. account. Therefore, the amount of those 
alleged expenses should not have been deducted from the amount of the 
P.O.D. account prior to the trial court determining Mr. Southwick's 
share of the P.O.D. account. Consequently, the Judgment awarding Mr. 
Southwick a share of the P.O.D. account should be amended to award Mr. 
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Southwick one-half of the amount of the items which were improperly 
charged to the P.O.D. account. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN AWARDING THE LEONES 
CONSERVATOR FEES IN THIS MATTER. 
A. The Leones' Request For Conservator Fees Is Barred By The Doctrine Of Unclean Hands 
And By Their Breach Of Their Fiduciary Duties As Guardians And Conservator Of The Estate 
Of Mrs. Southwick. Therefore. They Are Not Entitled To Any Conservator Fees In Connection 
With Their Alleged Actions As Conservator In This Matter. 
In their Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Conservator 
Fees, the Leones make the following assertions. 
6. Pursuant to U.C.A., 75-5-414 and 75-5-312(3), the co-
conservator/co-guardian, Sam D. Leone, hereby makes a claim 
against the estate for conservator fees for an average of 
ten hours per week expended on the protected person for 
sixty-eight (68) weeks with an average of eight (8) hours 
per week for care and maintenance and two (2) hours per week 
for accounting and special needs for a total of six hundred 
and eighty (680) hours. Sam D. Leone did average the wage 
of $25.00 per hour for the sixty-eight (68) weeks that he 
cared for his sister for a total claim of $17,000.00. 
(Record, page 454) 
7. Pursuant to U.C.A., 75-5-414 and 75-5-312(3), the co-
conservator/co-guardian, Frank L. Leone, hereby makes a 
claim against the estate for work on the estate from January 
9, 1990 to April 8, 1991 in the care for his sister and 
estate and for this time period of four hundred two (402) 
hours of time were involved and based upon his average 
salary of $33.69 an hour hereby makes a claim of $13,543.38. 
(Record, page 454-456) 
The Leones asked the trial to award them $30,543.38 for the services 
they allegedly provided for their sister during the year of her life 
that they were acting as her "Co-Conservator/Co-Guardians". 
During the time period the Leones were allegedly providing 
services to Mrs. Southwick and to her estate, Mrs. Southwick was cared 
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for in the Bennion Care Center, and she was receiving twenty-four hour 
a day care. The total bill to Bennion Care Center for Mrs. 
Southwick's care during the referenced period was less than 
$18,000.00, and that was for twenty-four hour a day care, three 
hundred sixty-five days a year. It is the epitome of gaul for the 
Leones to ask to be awarded "Conservator1 Fees" in an amount nearly 
twice the amount paid to the Bennion Care Center for Mrs. Southwick's 
twenty-four hour a day care. 
It is undisputed that during the time the Leones were allegedly 
acting as "Co-Conservator/Co-Guardians" for Mrs. Southwick that they 
willfully, knowingly and maliciously ignored the trial court's order 
and failed to keep the funds deposited in the P.O.D. account in a 
separate account, as required by the trial court's order of March 2, 
1988. It is also an undisputed fact that during the time the Leones 
were allegedly acting as "Co-Conservator/Co-Guardians" for Mrs. 
Southwick, in direct violation of this Court's Order of March 2, 1988, 
they used the funds contained in the P.O.D. account for purposes other 
than the care of Mrs. Southwick. It is further an undisputed fact 
that during the time the Leones were allegedly acting as "Co-
Conservators/Co-Guardians" for Mrs. Southwick, Sam or Frank and/or 
Sam, and Frank co-mingled the funds of the P.O.D. account with 
personal funds and that Sam or Frank and/or Sam and Frank used the 
proceeds of the P.O.D. account to invest in bonds and/or mutual funds. 
The actions of the Leones manifest a conscious disregard and 
contempt not only for the trial court, its orders and the judicial 
system in general but also an utter destain for the law and their 
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fiduciary duties as "Co-Guardians/Co-Conservators" of the Estate of 
Mrs. Southwick. Because the Leones have knowingly flouted the trial 
court's orders and authority and because they have breached their 
fiduciary duties as "Co-Guardians/Co-Conservator" of the Estate of 
Mrs. Southwick, the Leones came before the trial court with unclean 
hands. Consequently, they are estopped under the doctrine of Unclean 
Hands from making any claim upon the Estate of Mrs. Southwick for 
conservator fees. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law 
in concluding that the Leones were entitled to any payment for 
conservator fees, and the trial courtfs judgment awarding the Leones 
conservator fees must be reversed. 
B. The Leones' Claim For Conservator' Fees Is Barred By The Statute Of Limitations For 
Filing Claims Against An Estate. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Leones were in some way 
entitled to some payment for their alleged services as "Co-
conservator" of Mrs. Southwick, they failed to file a timely claim for 
such fees and their claim is therefore bared by the appropriate 
statute of limitations for making a claim against an estate. 
In pertinent part, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, §75-3-
803(1) [hereinafter, "§75-3-803(1)"] specifies as follows: 
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose 
before the death of the decedent, including claims of the 
state and any of its subdivisions, whether due or to become 
due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, 
founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not 
barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred 
against the estate, the personal representative, the heirs 
and devisees of the decedent, unless presented with the 
earlier of the following dates: 
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(a) one year after the decedent's death; or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 74-3-801(2) for 
creditors who are given actual notice, and where notice is 
published, within the time provided in Subsection 75-3-
801(1) for all claims barred by publication. 
In pertinent part, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, §75-3-
803(3)(b) [hereinafter, "§75-3-803(3)"] specifies as follows: 
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at 
or after the death of the decedent, including claims of the 
state and any subdivisions of, whether due or to become due, 
absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded 
on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred 
earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred against 
the estate, the personal representative, the heirs and 
devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows: 
(b) any other claim within the later of three 
months after it arises or the time provided by 
Subsection (1) (a). 
Pursuant to the express language of §75-3-803(1) and §75-3-803(3) 
the Leones' claims for "Conservator1 Fees" are time barred. 
Mrs. Southwick died on January 25, 1991. The Leones' first 
"Billing Request" was filed with the Court on February 21, 1992, 
nearly thirteen months after Mrs. Southwick died. Consequently, any 
claim the Leones allegedly have for services allegedly provided to 
Mrs. Southwick or to her Estate during her life time are barred by the 
provisions of §75-3-803(1) because such claims were not made within 
one (1) year as required by §75-3-803(1). 
The last date on which Frank Leone allegedly provided services to 
Mrs. Southwick or to her Estate was April 2, 1991. The last date on 
which Sam Leone allegedly provided services to Mrs. Southwick or to 
her Estate was December 31, 199 0. Any claims the Leones allegedly 
have for services allegedly provided to Mrs. Southwick's Estate 
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subsequent to her death are, therefore, barred by the provisions of 
§75-3-803(3) because such claims were not made within three months of 
the time the claims allegedly arose, as required by §75-3-803(3), or 
within one (1) year of Mrs. Southwick's death as required by §75-3-
803(3) and §75-3-803(1). 
Because the Leones1 claim for Conservator1 Fees was not filed 
within the time required by statute, the Leones' claims for 
conservator fees are barred by the appropriate statutes of 
limitations, even assuming their claims were reasonable and made in 
good faith, which they were not. Because the Leonesfs claims for 
Conservator Fees is barred by the express provisions of §75-3-803(3) 
and §75-3-803(1), the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding 
the Leones conservator fees. Therefore, the trial court's judgment 
awarding the Leones conservator fees must be reversed. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
LEONES HAD ANY LEGAL AUTHORITY TO PAY ANY ALLEGED EXPENSES OF 
MRS. SOUTHWICK'S ESTATE AFTER HER DEATH. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the alleged expenses for Mrs. 
Southwick's burial plot, her burial expenses, the Leones1 co-
conservator fees, the television & antenna, and court costs are 
accurate expenses that were actually incurred by the Leones, the 
Leones had no authority to pay any of those items after Mrs. 
Southwick's death. It is a basic principal of law that a guardian's 
power terminates with the death of the ward or protected person. 
The death of the ward necessarily terminates the 
guardianship. Thereupon all powers and duties of the 
guardian cease, except the duty to make a proper accounting 
21 
and settlement in the probate court, and powers necessarily 
implied from the existence of his duty. 
As between the guardian and the ward's personal representative, 
the relationship of debtor and creditor becomes established, and 
the right to the ward's property passes to the personal 
representative, subject to the guardian's right to retain 
possession thereof for the time necessary to settle the final 
accounting. 
39 C.J.S. Guardian & Ward, §§ 36-38, § 36, pages 79-80. 
All jurisdictions are in agreement that the death of a ward 
terminates the guardian's powers. A guardian's trust expires at the 
death of the ward, and upon the happening of that event, it is the 
duty of the guardian to account for and turn over to the proper heirs 
so much of the ward's estate as remains in his hands. Baaalav v. 
Lahaina Restoration Foundation, 588 P.2d 416, 60 Haw. 125. After the 
death of a ward, the guardian's powers are limited to rendering a 
final accounting and distributing property under his control to proper 
person; the guardian has no power to pay debts or obligations owed by 
ward's estate. Matter of Guardianship of Heath's Estate, 632 P. 2d 
908, 3 0 Wash.App 115. Death of the ward terminates the guardianship. 
Noyes v. First Nat. Bank of Rawlins, 589 P.2d 348. 
Because the Leones' "co-guardianship/co-conservatorship" 
terminated upon Mrs. Southwick's death on January 25, 1991, the Leones 
had no legal right or authority to act on behalf of Mrs. Southwick's 
estate after her death. The Leones were never appointed as personal 
representatives of Mrs. Leone's estate. Therefore, the Leones had no 
legal right to pay any bills after Mrs. Southwick's death and they had 
absolutely no right to spend money from the P.O.D. account, which was 
not a part of Mrs. Southwick's estate, to pay any bills or obligations 
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of any nature. A guardian has no power to pay debts or obligations of 
the ward's estate. Matter of Guardianship of Heathfs Estate, supra. 
Therefore, all of the payments made by the Leones subsequent to Mrs. 
Southwick's death are improper and unlawful and cannot be charged as 
expenses against the P.O.D. account to reduce Mr. Southwickfs interest 
in that account. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
LEONES WERE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE TO MR. SOUTHWICK FOR HIS SHARE 
OF THE P.O.D. ACCOUNT THEY GAVE TO CHRISTINE MONTOYA. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the 
Leones were not personally liable to Mr. Southwick for his share of 
the P.O.D. account they gave to Ms. Montoya or expended in an 
unauthorized and unlawful manner. 
As set forth in Point IV of this brief, the Leones were never 
appointed to act as the personal representative of the Estate of Mrs. 
Southwick and the Leones never had any authority to act on behalf of 
the Estate of Mrs. Southwick. As set forth in Point IV, a guardian's 
power terminates with the death of the ward or protected person. 
Therefore, the Leones not only did not have any authority to use the 
assets of the Estate of Mrs. Southwick after her death, they had 
absolutely no authority whatsoever to invade the P.O.D. account or to 
transfer any of the funds of the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya or 
anyone else. 
A guardian,is a trustee and is governed by the same rules that 
govern other trustees. A guardian is personally liable for any 
conversion of property under his care or supervision. 39 Am Jur 2d 
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Guardian and ward, § 187. 
In the instant matter the Leones were "co-guardians/co-
conservator" of Mrs. Southwick. In that capacity, they commingled 
funds of the P.O.D. account of which they were given charge and they 
misused the funds thereof. They violated their fiduciary duty to not 
only Mrs. Southwick but to all other persons who had a legal or 
equitable interest in Mrs. Southwick's estate and in the P.O.D. 
account. Therefore, the Leones are personally liable to Mr. Southwick 
for this share of the P.O.D. account which the Leones squandered, 
converted and/or disposed of to prevent Mr. Southwick from obtaining 
his rightful share thereof. 
Sam Leone admitted under oath, at the hearing to determine the 
amount of Mr. Southwick's interest in the P.O.D. account, that 
although the Leones knew that Judge Moffat's ruling that Mr. Southwick 
had no interest in the P.O.D. account was on appeal and although the 
Leones knew that Mr. Southwick had filed a Motion for Stay of Funds 
Pending appeal, the Leones nonetheless opted to give the P.O.D. funds 
to Ms. Montoya, although they knew that if the Court of Appeals 
reversed Judge Moffat's ruling Mr. Southwick would be entitled to half 
of the P.O.D. account. (Record, pages 851-852, 856-857). Sam Leone 
also testified under oath in the same proceeding that the Leones 
decision to give the P.O.D. funds to Mrs. Leone was based on the 
recommendation of their counsel Mr. Hadley. (Record, pages 851-852). 
The trial court's ruling that the Leones are not liable to Mr. 
Southwick for his share of the funds of the P.O.D. account given to 
Ms. Montoya is particularly interesting because the trial court ruled 
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at the same time that Ms. Montoya is liable to Mr. Southwick for the 
funds she received. This ruling is particularly curious because the 
court based its ruling that the Leones were not personally liable to 
Mr. Southwick on Judge Moffat's ruling that Mr. Southwick had no 
interest in the P.O.D. account. What makes the trial court's ruling 
so curious is that the very same ruling by Judge Moffat stated that 
Ms. Montoya was the sole beneficiary of the P.O.D. account. 
It is extremely difficult to understand how Ms. Montoya can be 
personally liable to Mr. Southwick for funds she received pursuant to 
Judge Moffat's, all-be-it improper ruling that she was the sole 
beneficiary of the P.O.D. account, yet, the Leones who had absolutely 
no legal authority to administer the P.O.D. account, in any manner 
whatsoever, have no personal liability for unlawfully converting the 
P.O.D. account to their own uses and then giving away the funds of the 
P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya. 
Because the Leones did not have any legal authority to act on 
behalf of the Estate of Mrs. Southwick or any legal authority to 
invade the P.O.D. account, the Leones are personally liable to Mr. 
Southwick for his share of the funds of the P.O.D. account they gave 
to Ms. Montoya. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law 
in concluding that the Leones were not personally liable to Mr. 
Southwick for his share of the P.O.D. account they gave to Ms. 
Montoya. 
X 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Because the t r i a l court erred in concluding that the expenses for 
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-Irs. Southwick's burial plot, her burial expenses, the Leones Co-
;onservator fees, the purchase of a television & antenna, and court 
:osts allegedly incurred by the Leones in their bad faith defense of 
r. Southwick's claim to his rightful share of the P.O.D. account were 
egitimate expenses for Mrs. Southwick's necessary support and 
aintenance chargeable against the P.O.D. the trial court comitted 
eversable and prejudicial error. Because the trial court erred in 
imputing Mr. Southwick's share of the P.O.D. account, because the 
rial court erred, as a matter of law, in concluding that the Leones 
ire entitled to any conservator fees, and because the trial court 
•red, as a matter of law, in concluding that the Leones were not 
rsonally liable for Mr. Southwick's share of the P.O.D. account they 
ve to Ms. Montoya the trial court again comitted reversable and 
ejudical error in this matter. Therefore, this Court must reverse 
2 trial courts1 judgment and direct the trial court to enter 
Igment in favor of Mr. Southwick against the Leones, personally, 
ding that the Leones are not entitled to any conservator fees, and 
expenses for Mrs. Southwick's burial plot, her burial expenses, 
Leones' Co-conservator fees, the purchase of a television & 
enna, and court costs allegedly incurred by the Leones in their bad 
th defense of Mr. Southwick's claim to his rightful share of the 
.D. account. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Southwick respectfully prays that this Court 
le an order reversing the judgment of the trial court and declaring 
the Leones are not entitled to any conservator fees in this 
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matter, that the expenses for Mrs. Southwickfs burial plot, her burial 
expenses, the Leones' Co-conservator fees, the purchase of a 
television & antenna, and court costs allegedly incurred by the Leones 
in their bad faith defense of Mr. Southwick's claim to his rightful 
share of the P.O.D. account are not chargeable against the P.O.D. 
account and 
that the Leones are personally liable to Mr. Southwick for his share 
of the P.O.D. account they gave to Ms. Montoya. 
Respectfully submitted this CS~^ day of February 1996. 
Ch£rtes-A. Schultz 
Attorney for Tracy L. Southwick 
27 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the c y L ^ day of February 1996, I served 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appeal Brief to the 
persons at the addresses listed below by depositing a copy in the 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code § 75-3-803(1) 
Utah Code § 75-3-803(3)(b) 
Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(k)2 
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75-3-719 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 136 
personal representative's compensation or the attorney's com-
pensation and if no objection is filed by an interested person to 
the compensation requested, reasonable compensation shall 
be the compensation sought in the petition. When an inter-
ested person objects to the personal representative's compen-
sation, the court shall determine reasonable compensation for 
the personal representative based on the quality, quantity, 
and value of the services rendered to the estate and the 
circumstances under which those services were rendered, 
including the practice for other fiduciaries who are in similar 
circumstances to the personal representative in question. 
When an interested person objects to the attorney's compen-
sation, the court shall determine reasonable compensation for 
the attorney based on rules adopted by the Judicial Council. 
(2) When a petition seeks approval of or objects to a 
personal representative's compensation or an attorney's com-
pensation, at least ten days before the time set for the hearing 
ofthe petition, the petitioner or the petitioner's attorney shall 
send a copy of the petition to all interested persons either by 
certified, registered, or first class mail or by hand-delivery. 
(3) If a will provides for compensation of the personal 
representative and there is no contract with the decedent 
regarding compensation, the personal representative may 
renounce the provision before qualifying and be entitled to 
reasonable compensation. A personal representative also may 
renounce his right to all or any part of the compensation. A 
written renunciation of fee may be filed with the court. 1992 
75-3-719. Expenses in estate litigation. 
If any personal representative or person nominated as 
personal representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding 
in good faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to 
receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disburse-
ments, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred. 1975 
75-3-720. Proceedings for review of employment of 
agents and compensation of personal repre-
sentatives and employees of estate. 
After notice to all interested persons, on petition of an 
interested person or on appropriate motion if administration 
is supervised, the propriety of employment of any person by a 
personal representative, including any attorney, auditor, in-
vestment advisor, or other specialized agent or assistant, the 
reasonableness of the compensation of any person so em-
ployed, or the reasonableness ofthe compensation determined 
by the personal representative for the personal representa-
tive's own services, may be reviewed by the court. Any person 
who has received excessive compensation from an estate for 
services rendered may be ordered to make appropriate re-
funds. 1992 
PART 8 
CREDITORS9 CLAIMS 
75-3-801. Notice to creditors 
(1) Unless notice has already been given under this section, 
a personal representative upon his appointment shall publish 
a notice to creditors once a week for three successive weeks in 
a newspaper of general circulation in the county announcing 
the personal representative's appointment and address and 
notifying creditors of the estate to present their claims within 
three months after the date of the first publication of the 
notice or be forever barred. 
(2) A personal representative may give written notice by 
mail or other delivery to any creditor, notifying the creditor to 
present his claim within 90 days from the published notice if 
given as provided in Subsection (1) above or within 60 days 
from the mailing or other delivery of the notice, whichever is 
later, or be forever barred. Written notice shall be the notice 
described in Subsection (1) above or a similar notice. 
(3) The personal representative shall not be liable to any 
creditor or to any successor ofthe decedent for giving or failing 
to give notice under this section. 199a 
75-3-802. Statutes of limitations. 
Unless an estate is insolvent the personal representative, 
with the consent of all successors whose interests would be 
affected, may waive any defense of limitations available to the 
estate. If the defense is not waived, no claim which was barred 
by any statute of limitations at the time of the decedent's 
death shall be allowed or paid. The running of any statute of 
limitations measured from some other event than death and 
advertisement for claims against a decedent is suspended 
during the three months following the decedent's death but 
resumes thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant to the 
sections which follow. For purposes of any statute of limita-
tions, the proper presentation of a claim under Section 75-3-
804 is equivalent to commencement of a proceeding on the 
claim. i»77 
75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims. 
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before 
the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and 
any subdivision of it, whether due or to become due, absolute 
or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, 
tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statute 
of limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal 
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, 
unless presented within the earlier of the following dates: 
(a) one year after the decedent's death; or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(2) 
for creditors who are given actual notice, and where notice 
is published, within the time provided in Subsection 
75-3-801(1) for all claims barred by publication. 
(2) In all events, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at 
the decedent's domicile are also barred in this state. 
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or 
after the death of the decedent, including claims of the state 
and any of its subdivisions, whether due or to become due, 
absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on 
contract, tort, or other legal basis are barred against the 
estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees 
of the decedent, unless presented as follows: 
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal 
representative within three months after performance by 
the personal representative is due; or 
(b) any other claim within the later of three month* 
after it arises, or the time specified in Subsection (lXa). 
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: 
(a) any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or 
other lien upon property of the estate; 
(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any 
proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or the 
personal representative for which he is protected by 
liability insurance; or 
(c) collection of compensation for services rendered and 
reimbursement for expenses advanced by the personal 
representative or by the attorney or accountant for the 
personal representative of the estate. i»92 
75-3-804. Manner of presentation of claims. 
(1) Claims against a decedent's estate may be presented as 
follows: 
(a) The claimant may deliver or mail to the personal 
representative, or the personal representative's attorney 
of record, a written statement of the claim indicating its 
basis, the name and address of the claimant, and the 
amount claimed, or may file a written statement of the 
78-2-5 JUDICIAL CODE 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct aila* 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. lfl86 
78-2-5. Repealed i&* 
78-2-6. Appel late court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks a**d 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the SuprerAe 
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks a £ d 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the SuprerAe 
Court. 19** 
78-2-7. Repealed. lift* 
78-2-7J5. Se rv i ce of sheriff t o c o u r t . 
The court may at any time require the attendance ai1^ 
services of any sheriff in the state. 1088 
78-2-8 t o 78-2-14. R e p e a l e d . 1986, 190s 
Section 
78-2a-l. 
78-2a-2. 
78-2a-3. 
78-2a-4. 
7S-2a-5. 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Creation — Seal. 
Number of judges — Terms — Functions 
Filing fees. 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Location of Court <tf A$^ e&\&. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions *-
Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The tern1 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three yea**8 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years afld 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following t h e 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is a p p o i n t ^ 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment i n 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be fry 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. Th e 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en batfc-
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge °f 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than t ^ ° 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court °f 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all 
j and to issue all writs and process necessaSj 
•y into effect its judgments, orders, and ijuj 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Con* 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme ( V ^ 
and the Judicial Council. ^ ^ 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same a*tfl 
ftie Supreme Court. j 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Court  l   j ri i ti  t  i  ll 
traordinary writs r J " " " —:j" J ( 
(a) to carry 
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, inc^i 
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from for^i 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals ft^ 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed! 
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commj. 
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the execute 
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from 
the small claims department of a circuit court; 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic rela* 
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul' 
ment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from th< 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and b5 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination an} 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
14) The Court of Appeals shall comply with ftie require 
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedure 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 19* 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Courts 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to th1 
Supreme Court. 19$ 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lak1 
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions D 
any location within the state. i* 
